The decision effectively puts an end to Tajikistan’s aspirations to explore closer security relations with non-CSTO nations. Following Tajikistan’s independence in 1991, Russia assumed the role of the country’s security guarantor. Russian border guards policed Tajikistan’s southern frontier until 2005. A Russian army division that had stayed in Tajikistan after the Soviet break-up was reorganized into a permanent military base in 2004. The base now has around 7,000 troops stationed in Dushanbe, Kulob, and Qurghonteppa (www.news.tj, October 21, 2011). Moscow has also been the largest provider of technical military assistance to Dushanbe.

Tajikistan participates in all Russian-led integration and regional security schemes, including the CSTO. The country contributes an infantry battalion to the group’s Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF). In April 2010, Tajikistan hosted the CRRF’s military exercises Boundary 2010 that aimed at preventing possible incursions of “terrorists from Afghanistan” (www.news.tj, April 26, 2010). In September 2011, the CSTO conducted exercises in Tajikistan as part of Tsentr 2011, which also trained the group’s militaries in preventing possible popular uprisings (EDM, September 30, 2011).

Its “strategic partnership” with Moscow notwithstanding, Tajikistan has cautiously sought to balance Russia’s influence by pursuing closer security cooperation with other major powers. After the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, Dushanbe granted the US military overflight rights and permitted the use of Dushanbe airport for emergency landings and refueling. Cables from the US embassy in Dushanbe, disclosed recently by WikiLeaks, suggest that in 2001 Tajikistan offered to host a US airbase at Kulob airport, in the country’s south, one hour’s flight from Kabul. US strategists declined the offer then, opting instead for the Ganci/Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan and the Karshi-Khanabad airbase in Uzbekistan.

After the US military was evicted from the Uzbek base, the then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, sought Tajikistan’s permission to open an airbase in the country during a meeting with President Emomali Rahmon in July 2006. According to an embassy cable, Rahmon told Rumsfeld that the deployment of US troops in Tajikistan was out of the question in light of Dushanbe’s “new international commitments,” that is, Moscow-dictated foreign policy priorities. As Tajikistan’s relations with Russia deteriorated in the late 2000s, Dushanbe made another proposal to host a US airbase in the country, most likely in 2009 (www.wikileaks.org, US Embassy in Dushanbe cables, July 6, 2006; February 10, 2010). It is unclear whether the proposal was considered by Washington.

Another NATO member, France, has deployed a small military contingent at Dushanbe since December 2001. Paris initially deployed two military transport aircraft, six mirage fighters, and some 150 personnel at the airport to handle airlift support, supply drops, and transit logistics in support of NATO troops in Afghanistan. The planes were relocated to Kandahar in 2007. Some 100 French troops and technicians remain in Dushanbe to refuel aircraft flying to and from Afghanistan (www.ozodi.org, January 2). The deployment of the French troops in Tajikistan has not been contested by either Russia or any other CSTO member, primarily because Paris has indicated that it does not seek a permanent military presence in the country.

Tajikistan has apparently also considered hosting an Indian airbase. From 2002-2010, Indian specialists refurbished the Soviet-built Ayni Airfield, some 25 kilometers west of Dushanbe, provoking speculation that New Delhi intended to use the facility as its first foreign military base. There were reports that India planned to deploy MiG-29 fighters and Mi-17 multi-purpose helicopters at the airbase. Although New Delhi has not officially confirmed its interest in basing rights in Tajikistan, senior Tajik government officials have repeatedly indicated that India’s access to the airfield requires approval from Moscow (EDM, February 22, 2011).

In exploring closer security cooperation with the US and India, the government of President Emomali Rahmon was motivated by a desire to counterbalance Russia’s influence in the country. In addition, Tajikistan apparently counted on economic and financial assistance and, more importantly, direct or indirect support for the existing regime. The CSTO agreement on foreign bases limits Tajikistan’s options and reasserts Moscow’s hold on the country, confirming how vulnerable the Tajik state has become to Russian political pressure. Tajikistan is excessively dependent on remittances from its migrant workers in Russia, and the Kremlin has repeatedly indicated that the presence of these workers in the country is conditional on Dushanbe’s willingness to follow Moscow-dictated foreign policy directives.

(By Alexander Sodiqov, published originally in the Eurasia Daily Monitor on January 16, 2012)

Bedaki was a mid-level opposition field commander during the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war. He later joined the police force, presumably as part of the 1997 peace accord where some former United Tajik Opposition (UTO) fighters were incorporated into Tajikistan’s security forces. He soon left the police and supposedly became a farmer. Following the September 19, 2010, attack on a government military convoy in the Rasht valley in eastern Tajikistan where 28 conscripts were killed, security agencies placed the blame on Bedaki and another former UTO commander, Abdullo Rahimov, aka ‘Mullo Abdullo’, killed in April 2011. Immediately after the attack, Bedaki’s brother, Husniddin Davlatov, was detained and alleged in a televised ‘confession’ that the convoy assault was led by his brother. Consequently, Bedaki became a key target of a security operation in the Rasht valley. His brother and father were convicted and sent to prison.

On January 4, 2011, the authorities announced that Bedaki had been killed in a shootout with government troops in the village of Runob, one kilometer south of the Rasht district center. The official narrative claimed that he and a number of his men were spotted by police and were subsequently killed in a four-hour gun battle. In February, however, the official narrative was challenged by a YouTube video. The footage showed an exhausted and humiliated bearded man, stripped to his underpants but with no apparent wounds, which relatives and former UTO fighters recognized as Bedaki. He was being questioned in the back seat of a parked car by what appeared to be members of the Tajik security agencies. Soon after, the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) said they saw the footage but refused to comment, while the police denounced the video as “an ordinary fake.” A modified account of Bedaki’s death was offered in April when Amirqul Azimov, then head of Tajikistan’s National Security Council, announced that Bedaki had been captured alive, but died due to gunshot wounds on the way to hospital.

Despite government denials, evidence pointing to the authenticity of the video appears indisputable. Observers have acknowledged the identical features of the still alive Bedaki as shown on YouTube and the body of a man broadcast on state television. On the YouTube video, a mustached, beret-wearing supposed security officer is at times seen holding a pistol at Bedaki’s forehead. The same man is also seen in the government-broadcast footage, posing with Bedaki’s dead body.

According to Tajik journalist Umed Babakhanov, unofficial sources have indicated that the security agents seen on the video were consequently tried by a military tribunal. A mid-level government official also told one of this article’s authors that the individuals in the video were rebuked for their actions. Still, no official announcement of repercussions against those who may have been responsible for Bedaki’s probable extrajudicial execution have been made.

The public has tacitly approved of the execution given Bedaki’s alleged involvement in anti-governmental activity and terrorist acts, which resulted in many deaths and threatened to destabilize Tajikistan. Local human rights groups were, in turn, largely silent likely due to both fear and professional incompetence. According to Babakhanov, “pure pragmatism” was the reason behind the media not raising the issue of Bedaki’s death as “nobody wants to harm the already difficult relations with the Government of Tajikistan because of the strange death of a militant linked to the Islamic opposition.” Independent analyst Parviz Mullojanov suggests that the Tajik opposition has been unwilling to raise the case because Bedaki did not have the support of other ex-UTO commanders and was not an influential figure to begin with. According to Mullojanov, preserving the fragile stability of Tajikistan and the Rasht valley has been much more important for all stakeholders than the truth about Bedaki’s death.

Key diplomatic missions in Tajikistan, such as the U.S., have prioritized hard security in their relationship with the Tajik government. During U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s two-day visit to Tajikistan in October 2011, cooperation with Tajikistan on the issues of Afghanistan and the ongoing ‘war on terror’ were highest on the agenda. Despite the fact that the U.S. Ambassador, Ken Gross, has been vocal on a few human rights cases involving journalists, the embassy has appeared to have a tacit policy of not criticizing Tajikistan in cases of torture or extrajudicial executions of alleged Islamist extremists.

International groups working in Tajikistan, such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have also been silent on this case. They have opted to curry favor with the authorities with ongoing projects involving security assistance, trainings of government bureaucrats and focusing on legislative reform. In May, the OSCE mission head, Ambassador Ivar Vikki of Norway, sided uncritically with the government’s narrative on Bedaki’s death during his annual address to the OSCE’s 56 member states in Vienna. Vikki made no mention of the mysterious circumstances surrounding the killings, having instead told that the deaths of Bedaki and his seven comrades occurred “during military operations.” According to Mullojonov, the silence of international organizations on this issue is “influenced by Bedaki’s image as an extremist and terrorist.” If he was “an ordinary citizen, an activist or journalist, their reaction would be completely different.”

The Economist Intelligence Unit reported in June that Bedaki’s death was not the result of a mere government raid or combat, but he was likely “captured, tortured and executed.” A few local actors also spoke out about the case. In a July speech in Dushanbe, Qayyum Yusuf, a prominent Tajik attorney, stated that the video of Bedaki being abused by government agents is “solid proof of a violation of human rights,” which adds to the “lowering of [Tajikistan’s] reputation in the international arena.”

(By Alexander Sodiqov and Payam Foroughi, originally published in the CACI Analyst on January 11, 2012)

The CoU’s statement alleged that on December 2, Nuriddin and Muhammadjon performed the Ashura ritual at the Muhammadiya Mosque. The mosque in the village of Turkobod, some 30 kilometers east of the Tajik capital Dushanbe, is one of the largest in the country. It belongs to the Turajonzoda family. Muhammadjon Turajonzoda served as the mosque’s imam after the elder brother, Nuriddin, had been forced by the authorities to resign in January 2011 (EDM, March 3, 2011).

“We are surprised that the ritual [of Ashura] was performed by members of the prominent religious family of Turajonzoda who claim to belong to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam,” the statement said, adding “This ritual is entirely in contradiction to the Hanafi tradition… [The] Turajonzoda brothers want to popularize an alien religious practice among our people… We must stay vigilant and protect our faith from various plots; we must not allow hypocritical individuals to endanger the spiritual unity of our nation…” The statement also implied that Turajonzoda brothers were responsible for political confrontation leading up to the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992-1997 (www.khovar.tj, December 9).

Responding to the statement, Hoji Akbar claimed that none of his brothers had observed the holiday of Ashura. The cleric also alleged that the statement attributed to the CoU was invalid because several members of the council had called him and insisted that they had not signed the document. According to Turajonzoda, the statement was part of an effort aimed at “discrediting his family in the eyes of President [Emomali] Rahmon” (www.islamnews.tj, December 7, 9).

Despite these claims, the council distributed the statement among all mosques in the country, requesting that imams read the statement at Friday prayers. Several imams who refused to do so have been replaced by the authorities (www.islamnews.tj, December 27). On December 9, the CoU’s head, Saidmukarram Abduqodirzoda, arrived at the Muhammadiya Mosque to familiarize the worshippers with the statement. The angry crowd at the mosque did not let him speak, and, after provocative statements by Nuriddin and Hoji Akbar, the worshippers demanded that Abduqodirzoda leave the mosque (www.regnum.ru, December 15).

Following the incident, the State Committee for Religious Affairs dismissed Nuriddin and appointed a new imam to the Muhammadiya Mosque. The committee also imposed a three-month ban on Friday prayers at the mosque. A Tajik court later ordered that Nuriddin and Hoji Akbar pay a fine of 350 somoni (about $70) each, allegedly for insulting Abduqodirzoda. The brothers told journalists that they would not appeal the ruling because “it had been made clearly under the pressure from certain government structures” (www.news.tj, December 14, 24). Given that the council’s statement was publicized by the government news agency and the court acted so quickly to impose a fine on the Turajonzoda brothers, there is little doubt that the latest round of pressure against the clerics had been initiated, or at least sanctioned, by the president’s office.

Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, who had been Tajikistan’s supreme Islamic authority in the final years of Soviet rule, became the second most senior leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) during the civil war. Following the 1997 peace accords, the cleric was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister, apparently in exchange for denouncing the Islamic Revival Party and supporting Emomali Rahmon in the elections. In 2005, Rahmon removed Turajonzoda from the government by making him a senator. Since then, Turajonzoda has heavily criticized the government for curbing religious freedoms in the country. This criticism has cost him his seat in the parliament in 2010. Moreover, government-owned newspapers launched a smear campaign against the cleric, denouncing him as an “enemy” of the country. An arson attack that damaged Turajonzoda’s cotton-processing plant last year was interpreted as an attempt to intimidate the cleric (EDM, November 2, 2011).

Independent experts say these developments risk exacerbating the rift between independently minded Tajik imams and citizens, on the one hand, and state-supported religious leaders, on the other hand. Tajikistan is officially secular, although more than 98 percent of its almost 8 million people are Muslims. Tajik authorities view the growing religiosity of the population as a threat. Hence, any religious expression beyond state-supported spiritual teachings is fervently curbed, ostensibly to prevent extremism. Hundreds of people have been jailed in recent years for membership of banned Islamist groups. At the same time, little is done to address root causes of extremism, including poverty, unemployment, rampant corruption and nepotism. Experts also suggest that the authorities often use the threat of Islamic extremism as a pretext to crack down on its political opponents.

(By Alexander Sodiqov, originally published in the Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 6, 2012)

Well, football is actually something that Rustam Emomali has to understand very well. He is the founder of the football club Istiqlol Dushanbe, and has both played for the team as striker and served as its captain. The club won the national championship twice over the last two years (with some fans suggesting that part of the club’s success had to do with favorable refereeing).

Hopefully, the responsibilities that come with the new post will not add too much load on Rustam, who is already pretty busy. The Tajik president’s son is in charge of fighting illegal activity as part of the Customs Service. He is also head of Tajikistan’s Youth Union and a member of the Olympic Council of Asia’s International Relations committee. In the past, Rustam headed a department at the State Committee for Investments and State Property Management and held a seat in the Dushanbe City Council.

Rustam is ninth on the list of the top 20 most influential people in Tajikistan, which was recently compiled by the country’s leading political newspaper Asia-Plus.

As the country’s new football chief, Rustam replaces civil war-era field commander Suhrob Kosimov (aka Suhrob Kamandir), who held the position since 2002. Kosimov, who did not run for the position (and against Rustam) this year, has been named an “honorary” president of the Federation.

Parviz Davlatbekov, 24, was murdered in a knife attack in a residential area of Dushanbe early in the morning on January 1. He had dressed as Santa Claus (known more commonly in Tajikistan by its Russian name, ‘Ded Moroz’ or ‘Father Frost’) and was on his way to a party at his relatives’ place when some 30 young men attacked him. According to witnesses, the men shouted “infidel” as they beat Davlatbekov, referring to the Christian origins of Santa Claus as a character. Davlatbekov was rushed to the hospital, where he died the next day of wounds inflicted in the attack.

Tajikistan was part of the officially atheist Soviet Union for almost 70 years. During the Soviet rule, most Tajik families began celebrating the New Year and accepted Santa Claus as the holiday’s main attribute. Following the country’s independence in 1991, most Tajiks continued celebrating the New Year, and Santa Claus remained a widely accepted symbol. However, the increasing religiosity of Tajikistan’s population, more than 95 percent of which are Muslims, has recently given rise to debates over whether the celebration of the New Year and the holiday’s attributes contradict Islamic beliefs. For instance, Saidmukarram Abdulkodirzoda, the head of the Council of Ulems (the highest religious authority in Tajikistan), recently announced that the New Year holiday is “alien to our people and our religion.” Yet, New Year has remained an official holiday in the country, and Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon delivers a televised New Year address every year.

Here’s an excerpt:

The concert hall at the Syndey Opera House holds 2,700 people. This blog was viewed about 9,700 times in 2011. If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 4 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

Click here to see the complete report.

Consequently, the newspaper decided to ask 30 leading journalists and political and economic analysts in the country to name the most influential individuals in Tajikistan and rank them in terms on their influence on political decision-making and appointments, economics and finance, security forces, and public opinion. As a result, the Asia-Plus has compiled a list of the top 20 persons that have the power to shape the future of Tajikistan.

The list is as follows:

1. Emomali Rahmon, the President of Tajikistan. This has hardly come as a surprise to anyone. He holds an unchallenged monopoly on political power in the country, and there are no signs that this might change anytime soon.

2. Mahmadsaid Ubaydulloyev, the chairman of the upper house of Tajikistan’s Parliament (since 2000) and the mayor of Dushanbe (since 1996). Ubaydulloyev’s second place on the list is rather surprising because his influence is not always apparent.

3. Hasan Asadullozoda, the head of Tajikistan’s largest bank, Oriyon Bank, and the most influential businessman in the country. He controls several major companies, including an airline company, and a firm that supplies bauxite for Tajikistan’s state-owned aluminum company, the largest source of revenues for the country. Asadullozoda also has major stakes in the country’s cotton, insurance, investment, restaurant, retail, hotel, and telecommunications markets. A June 2008 US embassy cable, disclosed recently by WikiLeaks, offers a very apt description of Asadullozoda’s role in Tajikistan’s economy: “Many of those who know Asadullozoda have said that his primary motivation is to control as many revenue generating enterprises as possible, to the exclusion of others. Businesspeople in Tajikistan view him as a predator, and they fear losing their businesses to Asadullozoda’s draconian methods.”

4. Murodali Alimardon, the country’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs since 2008. Prior to this job, he headed Tajikistan’s National Bank. An audit conducted in 2009 revealed that more than US$1 billion of the Bank’s funds disappeared while Alimardon headed the institution. The government did not comment on the audit results. Alimardon is a close friend of President Rahmon.

5. Matlubkhon Davlatov, head of the President’s Office since 2010. Prior to this job, Davlatov served for almost five years as an economic adviser to the President. Asia-Plus suggests that Davlatov is most probably a relative of President Rahmon.

6. Khamrokhon Zarifi, Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister since 2006. Zarifi worked for 19 years in the Soviet KGB and its successor in Tajikistan, the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). In 1995, he was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister. Afterwards, he served as Tajikistan’s ambassador to the UN, OSCE, Austria, Switzerland, and Hungary.

7. Sherkhon Salimzoda, the country’s Prosecutor General since 2010. Prior to this job, Salimzoda headed the anti-corruption agency in 2007-2009 and served as a presidential adviser on legal matters.

8. Saymumin Yatimov, the head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), successor to the Soviet KGB. Before the Soviet Union’s collapse, Yatimov taught the Tajik language and literature to secondary school students. After 1991, he held various government jobs, working in the country’s embassy in Iran, serving as deputy head of GKNB (2000-2005), first deputy minister of foreign affairs (2005-2007), and then Tajikistan’s ambassador to Belgium, NATO, and the European Community (2007-2010). President Rahmon appointed Yatimov to Tajikistan’s top security post in September 2010, following the escape of 25 convicts from the GKNB’s high-security detention facility in Dushanbe.

9. Rustam Emomali, President Rahmon’s eldest son. In March, Rustam was appointed to head the State Customs Service’s smuggling-busting department. The job came with a rank of the major. Rustam also serves as deputy head of the Youth Union and vice-president of the country’s soccer federation. Despite his young age, Rustam has already headed a department in the State Investments Committee and served as a member of the Dushanbe City Council. Rustam’s speedy “career” has generated speculation that Rahmon is grooming his son to succeed him in office.

10. Sherali Gul, Tajikistan’s Minister of Energy and Industry since 2006. Gul is a relative of President Rahmon, and this is perhaps the only reason why he has managed to keep his post for so long. Prior to this job, Gul headed the State Committee on State Property Management (2001-2006).

11. Abdurakhim Qakhkhorov (Kahharov), the Minister of Internal Affairs since 2009. Little is known about Qakhkhorov except for the fact that he is a career police officer. It is worth noting that the Tajik police under his leadership is increasingly haunted by allegations of severe detainee abuse.

12. Mukhiddin Kabiri, the head of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). Kabiri is the only opposition party leader on this list. In September, he was reelected as IRPT’s head. Kabiri is increasingly viewed as a dedicated reformer who can present a viable alternative to the incumbent president. This view is also prevalent in western embassies and capitals where Kabiri is always given warm reception.

13. Shukurjon Zukhurov, the chairman of the lower house of Tajikistan’s Parliament since 2010. In 2006-2010, Zukhurov worked as the Minister of Labor and Social Protection.

14. Sherali Khayrulloyev, Tajikistan’s Defense Minister since 1995. Prior to this job, Khayrulloyev served as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs from 1988 to 1995.

15. Khoji Akbar Turajonzoda, a prominent Islamic cleric. In 1988, Turajonzoda was appointed as Tajikistan’s supreme religious authority, the Qazi-kalon. After the beginning of the civil war in 1992, he fled the country and became the second most senior leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). As the war ended, Rahmon made Turajonzoda first deputy prime minister in his government. An August 7, 2009 cable from the US embassy in Dushanbe, disclosed recently by WikiLeaks, describes the appointment as the result of a “gentlemen’s agreement” between Turajonzoda and the Tajik president: in exchange for the post, Turajonzoda agreed that he would not challenge Rahmon for the presidency. Hence, the cleric publicly denounced the IRPT and supported Rahmon in the 1999 presidential election. In 2005, however, Rahmon removed him from the government by appointing Turajonzoda to the upper chamber of the country’s parliament. After becoming a senator, Turajonzoda turned openly critical of the government’s increasingly restrictive religion policy. Following the 2010 elections, Rahmon did not reappoint him to the parliament. In October, a cotton plant belonging to the cleric was damaged by arson. This was widely interpreted as an attempt to warn Turajonzoda against criticizing the government’s policy on religion.

16. Tahmina Rahmonova, President Rahmon’s daughter. Tahmina controls a nationwide television channel, TV Safina, and is believed to control a large bank and several shops and restaurants in Dushanbe. The Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty has recently listed Tahmina among “Central Asia’s 10 Most Influential (And Connected) Women“.

17. Amonullo Khukumatullo, the head of the state-owned Tajik Railway Company. He is also believed to control a state agency in charge of oil imports to the country, of which he had previously been the director. One of Khukumatullo’s sons is married to President Rahmon’s oldest daughter, Firuza.

18. Fattoh Saidov, head of the Financial Control and Anti-Corruption Agency since 2009.

19. Jamoliddin Nuraliyev, Tajikistan’s Deputy Finance Minister. Nuraliyev, who is married to President Rahmon’s daughter, Ozoda, is also believed to own a company which collects tolls on a major road connecting central Tajikistan with the north of the country.

20. Ozoda Rahmonova, President Rahmon’s daughter and Deputy Foreign Minister (since 2009). She is on the Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty’s list of “Central Asia’s 10 Most Influential (And Connected) Women” together with her sister Tahmina.

BACKGROUND: The pilots – Vladimir Sadovnichy, a Russian citizen, and Alexei Rudenko, an Estonian citizen – were detained in March after landing two cargo planes at a Tajik airport without permission. Several months later, they were charged with smuggling, illegal border crossing, and violating international aviation regulations. On November 8, a Tajik court found the pilots guilty on all three charges and sentenced them to eight and a half years in prison. The pilots alleged that the charges brought against them had been trumped up by Tajik security agencies as a justification for confiscating the aircrafts.

The conviction of the Russian pilot caused uproar in Moscow, with President Dmitry Medvedev announcing that Russia’s reaction would be “asymmetric.” Shortly afterwards, Russian authorities detained about 300 Tajik migrant workers and expelled 60 of them, allegedly for incorrect paperwork. This was followed by public announcements that Tajik nationals commit more crimes per capita and have higher rates of HIV and tuberculosis than workers from other countries. Hence, Russian officials and parliamentarians proposed that the Kremlin introduce a temporary ban on migrant workers from Tajikistan and visas for Tajik citizens. The backlash from Russia prompted Dushanbe to free the pilots on November 22 (see 11/30/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst).

Analysts have explained Moscow’s harsh reaction to Sadovnichy’s imprisonment as part of an election strategy designed to mobilize public support for the ruling party, United Russia, ahead of the December 4 parliamentary elections. Taking a tough stance against migrant workers has traditionally been popular with Russian voters, particularly those with a nationalist bent. Therefore, state-controlled media extensively covered the Kremlin’s tough measures against Tajik workers, fomenting strong anti-migrant sentiments in Russia.

The Kremlin also had to act decisively in order to reassure domestic audiences of Russia’s continued international relevance. The ability of Moscow to protect its citizens abroad was questioned at home after Russian diplomats failed to secure the release of Viktor Bout and Konstantin Yaroshenko, who had been imprisoned in the U.S. earlier in the year. Bout, who had been described as the world’s leading illicit arms dealer, was detained in Thailand in 2008 and extradited to the U.S.. On November 2, he was convicted of conspiring to kill American citizens by selling weapons to Colombian rebels. Bout is now facing between 25 years and life in prison. Yaroshenko was detained in Liberia in an international drug bust in 2010 and brought to the U.S. for trial. In September, he was sentenced to 20 years in jail for conspiring to smuggle narcotics to the U.S.

Russia has denounced the detention of its citizens by American security agents in third countries and demanded that Bout and Yaroshenko be freed. However, Washington ignored Moscow’s criticism, prompting many Russians to interpret this as a sign of their country’s weakness. Therefore, by resorting to strong rhetoric and harsh punitive actions directed at Dushanbe, the Kremlin aimed to restore public confidence in its international strength.

IMPLICATIONS: To many people in Tajikistan, the incident with foreign pilots has demonstrated the country’s vulnerability to Russian pressures and their country’s lack of real independence from Moscow. Since the 1990s, Russia has been the main destination for labor migrants from Tajikistan. The cash that an estimated 1 to 1.5 million Tajik workers in Russia send home is critical to the country’s economy. In 2010, Tajikistan received US$ 2.1 billion in officially recorded remittances, which was equivalent to about one-third of its GDP. The World Bank estimates that this year, remittance inflows will total US$ 2.7 billion, making Tajikistan the world’s most remittance-dependent economy for the third consecutive year.

Tajikistan’s dependence on migrant remittances, about 98 percent of which originate in Russia, is at the root of Moscow’s leverage over Dushanbe. As the main destination for migrant workers from Tajikistan, Russia holds considerable potential to wield influence, cajole, and bully. The authorities in Dushanbe recognize that any significant cut in the number of Tajiks permitted to work in Russia could have disastrous repercussions for Tajikistan’s economy and the stability of President Emomali Rahmon’s regime. If Moscow begins to deport Tajik workers en masse, as it had previously done with labor migrants from Georgia, the stagnant Tajik economy will be unable to absorb a flood of returning workers. This will also undermine the country’s progress in poverty alleviation as remittances provide the most basic needs of about half of the country’s population. A rapid drop in remittances will also trigger a severe fiscal crisis, which – by eroding the ruling group’s capacity to distribute patronage and to pay salaries of civil servants and security personnel – might seriously threaten regime survival.

Tajik experts suggest that Moscow’s aggressive reaction to Sadovnichy’s verdict will cause Dushanbe to seek alternative destinations for its surplus labor more intensively. Following the recent deportation of about 60 Tajiks from Russia, Tajikistan’s top migration official Safialloh Devonaev suggested that the deported individuals would be sent to work in Belarus under a bilateral agreement signed in October. It is highly unlikely, however, that Belarus or any other country would be able to provide jobs for a significant number of Tajik nationals in the near future. Dushanbe’s previous attempts to find additional major destinations for its migrant workers have been largely unsuccessful.

The recent incident has also resulted in growing anti-Russian sentiment in Tajikistan. Prominent Tajik journalist Umed Babakhanov suggests that the Kremlin’s aggressive behavior vis-à-vis migrant workers angered many people in Tajikistan. “As a result of this incident, the Tajik public and the ruling elite have become convinced that the country traditionally perceived as a ‘strategic partner’ will not hesitate to utilize [excessive pressure] in its relations with Tajikistan,” said Babakhanov. The increasing disillusionment with Russia among Tajiks is evident in articles published in independent Tajik newspapers and bitter comments in social media. Babakhanov suggests that the changing public perception of Russia might cause Dushanbe to distance itself from Moscow. According to the journalist, such an outcome is likely to prompt the Kremlin to attempt to replace the Tajik president with a more loyal figure.

CONCLUSIONS: Moscow’s harsh reaction to the conviction of its citizen in Tajikistan was part of an election strategy aiming to mobilize additional public support for the United Russia party and reassure the population of Russia’s continued international strength. In pursuing this short term gain, Moscow has harmed its relations with Dushanbe, which had traditionally been its most loyal ally in Central Asia. Tajik authorities released the Russian pilot along with his Estonian colleague, but this appears to have come with a significant drawback for bilateral ties. Infuriated by the massive detention of Tajik migrant workers and their continued abuse by authorities, employers, and ultranationalist groups in Russia, a growing number of Tajiks suggest that the government revisit its “strategic partnership” with Moscow.

(By Alexander Sodiqov, December 14, 2011 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Shodiyev’s relatives insist on a different explanation of his death. According to his mother, he told her in the hospital that he was beaten and given electric shocks at the hands of the police, until he confessed to a crime he had not committed. Following the incident, the Tajik human rights ombudsman and an anti-torture group called on the authorities to investigate Shodiyev’s death. The growing publicity about the case led the authorities to launch an investigation as a result of which several police officers were dismissed; one facing criminal charges (www.news.tj, November 9, 15).

Analysts and human rights groups claim that what happened to Shodiyev is not an isolated incident, but part of a larger pattern of abuse in detention by police and security forces. In March, another detainee, Safarali Sangov, died in a Dushanbe hospital in almost identical circumstances. He was hospitalized several hours after being detained on drug-related charges. While police claimed that Sangov tried to commit suicide by hitting his head against a wall and jumping from a police station window, his relatives insisted that he died of police brutality (Asia-Plus, March 7). Also, in June, Ismoil Bachajonov, who was accused of drug smuggling, died in mysterious circumstances in a pre-trial facility in Dushanbe (Asia-Plus, June 9), while two minors were allegedly heavily beaten by police in the southern town of Kulob. In addition, a BBC reporter, Urunboi Usmonov, held for a month by the police in Khujand, was allegedly tortured to extract a confession (www.rsf.org, August 13).

Brutality and torture are believed to be particularly exercised against individuals detained on suspicion of drug trafficking and membership in banned Islamist groups as a means of extracting information and confession. Most often, police abuse is unreported due to the prevailing public perception of impunity enjoyed by law enforcement structures. Fear of reprisal has also led most journalists to avoid reporting on the practice of torture and possible extrajudicial killings by Tajik security forces. An investigative article by a reporter on the widespread practice of torture (“Investigation or Interrogation”, Asia-Plus, December 21, 2010) led to repeated questioning of the reporter in what appears to have been implied threats by the Prosecutor’s Office and a lawsuit filed against the paper by the head of Tajikistan’s Department for Prevention of Organized Crime. The case was eventually settled out of court (www.ozodi.org, November 23).

A case, which initially received some coverage by the Tajik media, but no follow-up coverage, was the killing of Alovuddin Davlatov (aka ‘Ali Bedaki’) in January 2011. Bedaki was a mid-level opposition field commander during the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war. After refusing to recognize the 1997 peace accord with the government, Bedaki traveled to Afghanistan with a number of former fighters where he reportedly fought alongside the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Following the September 19, 2010 attack on a government military convoy in Rasht valley in eastern Tajikistan, the authorities blamed the incident on Bedaki’s group.

On January 4, 2011, the authorities announced that Bedaki and a number of his men were killed as a result of a four-hour gun battle with government forces. However, a mobile phone video that began to circulate and was placed on YouTube undermined this explanation. The four-minute footage shows what appear to be members of Tajik security agencies questioning and abusing a bearded man, whom they address as “Bedak,” in the back seat of a parked car. The State Committee for National Security (GKNB) has acknowledged that they saw the video, but refused to comment, while a high-level police official called the video “an ordinary fake.” Meanwhile, relatives of Bedaki and former opposition fighters confirmed that the man in the video was indeed him. The presence of the video and the refusal of the authorities to elaborate on it indicate that Bedaki was likely captured alive and subsequently “tortured and executed” (Economist Intelligence Unit, September 2011), most probably by one of Tajikistan’s security agencies.

(By Alexander Sodiqov and Payam Foroughi, published originally in the Eurasia Daily Monitor on December 7, 2011).

Sadovnichy and Rudenko were flying their Antonov-72 cargo planes from Afghanistan to Russia on March 12 when Tajik air traffic controllers denied them permission to land for refueling at the Qurghonteppa (Kurgan-Tube) Airport in southern Tajikistan. The pilots landed their aircrafts anyway, claiming that they did not have enough fuel to return to Kabul. After the landing, the crews of the two planes were placed by State Committee for National Security (GKNB) forces in a hotel where they were held for about two months. In May, Tajik authorities formally arrested Sadovnichy and Rudenko, but released the rest of the crew. Following a trial that had been kept mostly low-profile, the two pilots were on November 8 found guilty of smuggling, violating international aviation regulations, and illegally crossing Tajikistan’s border. They were each sentenced to eight and a half years in prison and the planes were confiscated as “physical evidence”.

It remains unclear what prompted Tajik authorities to arrest the pilots and hand out such unusually harsh sentences. The most plausible explanation so far has been proposed by Sadovnichy and the management of Rolkan Investments Limited (RIL), the company that owns the planes. Sadovnichy holds that Tajik security agencies wanted to keep the valuable Antonov-72 aircrafts. According to the pilot, he and Rudenko were kept in Tajikistan as hostages, while Tajik security agencies negotiated with the head of RIL, Sergey Poluyanov, forcing him to donate the two planes to Tajikistan or sell them at a “symbolic price.” Poluyanov insists that the Antonov-72 aircrafts, which were designed for the Soviet military, were the Tajik authorities’ real target because of the planes’ unique ability to operate from unpaved strips in the harshest conditions. Because the RIL is registered in the British Virgin Islands, the authorities in Dushanbe allegedly believed they could appropriate the company’s aircraft without significant international repercussions.

It appears that Afghan authorities were also eying the aircrafts that had worked in Afghanistan since 2008. On November 10, Tajikistan’s Prosecutor General, Sherkhon Salimzoda, announced that Dushanbe impounded the two planes following a request from Afghanistan’s Transport Ministry. According to Salimzoda, the RIL operated three cargo aircraft in Afghanistan for almost three years without proper paperwork. Anticipating problems with the Afghan authorities, the RIL allegedly ordered that its planes leave Kabul. The hasty departure from Afghanistan might be the reason why the pilots landed the aircrafts in Tajikistan without permission. The Afghan connection became particularly apparent following the report on November 16 that another freight plane belonging to the RIL was impounded in Kabul.

In addition to this explanation, there has been media speculation that President Emomali Rahmon wanted to swap the Russian pilot for a close relative, Rustam Khukumov, who is imprisoned in Russia on a drug trafficking conviction. Other observers have interpreted the jailing of the foreign pilots in Tajikistan as a sign of Rahmon’s geopolitical bravado, aiming to demonstrate his independence from Moscow to potential partners in the West.

The conviction of the Russian pilot infuriated politicians in Moscow. On November 9, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that the incident raised “multiple questions” and that Russia’s reaction might involve “asymmetric” means. The speaker of the upper house of Russia’s parliament, Valentina Matvienko, demanded that Sadovnichy be freed, warning that “if our voice is not heard [in Tajikistan]… Russia reserves the right to use a variety of sanctions.”

Following these announcements, Russian migration authorities began rounding up Tajik migrant workers. Within a week after the verdict, more than 300 Tajik migrants were detained and over 60 of them were deported from Russia, allegedly for incorrect paperwork. Russia’s Federal Migration Service (FMS) reportedly stopped issuing work permits to Tajik citizens. FMS chief Konstantin Romdodanovsky told Medvedev during a televised meeting that Tajik migrants are leaders in crimes per capita among the nationals of other Central Asian countries working in Russia. Russia’s chief public health official, Gennady Onishchenko, announced that Tajik nationals also have higher rates of HIV and tuberculosis, suggesting a temporary ban on labor migration from Tajikistan. Some Russian parliamentarians proposed that Moscow introduce visas for Tajik citizens.

Tajikistan had few means to withstand Russia’s “asymmetric” response. Remittances sent home by an estimated one million Tajik labor migrants in Russia account for about 40 percent of the country’s GDP, keeping hundreds of thousands of Tajik families out of extreme poverty. Therefore, Dushanbe had no other choice but to bow to the pressure. On November 12, Tajik media reported that President Rahmon “took personal control” of the jailed pilots’ case. Ten days later, a court used the national amnesty announced by Rahmon earlier in the year to reduce the initial sentences to Sadovnichy and Rudenko to two and a half years, and to free both individuals. While the release of the pilots has been welcomed by most in Tajikistan as a critical condition for the normalization of bilateral ties with Moscow, some analysts condemned the move as demonstrating Tajikistan’s vulnerability to Russian pressures.

(By Alexander Sodiqov, originally published in the CACI Analyst, on November 30, 2011)